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Judicial Review of the Aviation Hazard Determinations for Cape Wind:   
Why The FAA Got It Wrong 
Michael DeLoreto* 
 
“Though human ingenuity may make various inventions…it will never devise any inventions 
more beautiful, nor more simple, nor more to the point than Nature does.” – Leonardo Da Vinci1 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 This paper examines the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Town of 
Barnstable v. FAA2 which stalled development of a major offshore wind farm project.  
Harnessing the wind to power human activity started in early 500 A.D. when Persians 
constructed the first known windmills.3  In 1854, the first known windmill that would spin in 
whatever direction the wind blew and could automatically slow itself down was invented here in 
the United States.4  Americans have continued in the tradition of ingenuity to capture the power 
of Nature, but with much greater efficiency and far more developed technology.5  Over 51,000 
megawatts of power is generated from wind in the United States today and our nation accounts 
for twenty percent of the global generation of wind energy.6  This number is expected to grow as 
the United States embarks on an ambitious plan to provide 10 gigawatts of offshore wind 
generating capacity by the year 2020 and 54 gigawatts by 2030.7   
                                                 
* J.D. Candidate, 2014, Seton Hall University School of Law; M.P.A., University of Pennsylvania.; B.A., Drew 
University.  The author thanks his wife and family for their ongoing support and his faculty advisor, Professor Marc 
Poirier, for his guidance during the writing process. 
1 NOTEBOOKS OF LEONARD DA VINCI, XIV, (Jean Paul Richter ed., 1880). 
2 659 F.3d 28, 31 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
3 Phyllis Mckenzie, World History of Windmills, http://www.utexas.edu/gtc/assets/pdfs/windmills_world.pdf (last 
visited Sept. 15, 2012). 
4 Id.  This technology was developed by Daniel Halladay of Connecticut.  Id. 
5 See generally Dennis G. Sheppard, Historical Development of the Windmill, NASA CONTRACTOR REPORT 4337 
(1990), available at http://wind.nrel.gov/public/library/shepherd.pdf .  
6 Industry Statistics, AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N,  http://www.awea.org/learnabout/industry_stats/index.cfm (last 
visited November 10, 2012).  To put this power generation in perspective, one megawatt of wind energy is enough 
to power at least 240 homes.  FAQ, TRADE WIND ENERGY, 
http://www.tradewindenergy.com/windlibrary_sub.aspx?id=136 (last visited October 12, 2012).  
7 Press Release, Dep’t of the Interior, Salazar, Chus Announce Major Offshore Wind Initiatives, (Feb. 7, 2011), 
available at http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/Salazar-Chu-Announce-Major-Offshore-Wind-Initiatives.cfm.  
This initiative would produce enough power by 2020 for 2.8 million homes and 15.2 million homes by 2030.  Id. 
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The first of these major offshore wind projects in the United States was slated to be Cape 
Wind, located off the coast of Massachusetts in Nantucket Sound.8  Cape Wind is expected to 
have 130 turbines located between five and thirteen miles from the Massachusetts shoreline.9  
This project can generate 174 megawatts of energy on average, with a maximum generating 
capacity of 486 megawatts.10  Cape Wind advocates claim that this wind farm will be able to 
provide seventy-five percent of all the power needed for Cape Cod, Martha’s Vineyard, and 
Nantucket.11   
Despite the push for green technology and the issuance of approvals from various federal 
agencies including the Department of Interior (DOI) and Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA), Cape Wind has met strong resistance from the surrounding local towns, the homeowners 
in those communities, and even Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., the son of Robert F. Kennedy and a 
Senior Attorney for the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC).12  In January 2011, the 
Town of Barnstable, Massachusetts and the non-profit group The Alliance to Protect Nantucket 
                                                 
8Project at a Glance, CAPE WIND, 
http://www.capewind.org/modules.php?op=modload&name=Sections&file=index&req=viewarticle&artid=24&pag
e=1 (last visited September 10, 2012).  This project was the first to be given a license by the Department of the 
Interior, but there are other projects including a wind project off the coast of Atlantic City, NJ which may be 
completed before Cape Wind due to the ongoing litigation which is the focus of this comment.  See generally Press 
Release, FISHERMEN’S ENERGY, Fishermen’s Energy Receives Final Construction Permit, (July 19, 2012) 
http://www.fishermensenergy.com/press-releases/Press-Release%20Fishermen's-USACOE-Permits.pdf. 
9 Frequently Asked Questions – Cape Wind Basics, CAPE WIND, http://www.capewind.org/FAQ-Category4-
Cape+Wind+Basics-Parent0-myfaq-yes.htm (last visited September 10, 2012).   
10 Id.   
11 Id.  The entire area of Cape Cod, Martha’s Vineyard, and Nantucket used 230 megawatts of energy annually.  
Press Release, CAPE WIND, Independent experts agree, Cape Wind electricity will power Cape & Islands and reduce 
pollution and energy prices (June 3, 2003) 
http://www.capewind.org/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=81&mode=thread&order=0&t
hold=0.  
12 Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., An Ill Wind Off Cape Cod, N.Y. TIMES, (Dec. 16, 2005) available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/16/opinion/16kennedy.html ; Press Release, DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, Secretary 
Salazar Announces Approval of Cape Wind Energy Project on Outer Continental Shelf of Massachusetts (April 28, 
2010), available at http://www.doi.gov/news/doinews/Secretary-Salazar-Announces-Approval-of-Cape-Wind-
Energy-Project-on-Outer-Continental-Shelf-off-Massachusetts.cfm; Determination of No Hazard to Air Navigation, 
FED. AVIATION ADMIN. STUDY NO. 2009-WTE-332-OE (2010) available at 
http://www.capecodtoday.com/downloads/capewind_dnh.pdf (hereinafter “Study No. 2009-WTE-332-OE”).  
Further, the NRDC is a supporter of the project.  See infra discussion and sources cited accompanying note 80. 
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Sound filed an action in the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit to stop the wind farm from 
being constructed.13  The petitioners argued that the FAA determination stating the wind turbines 
did not pose a hazard to aviation was issued arbitrarily and capriciously.14  Their reasoning was 
the FAA “misread its own regulations, and . . . failed to calculate the dangers posed to local 
aviation.”15  Although the FAA opposed the relief sought, the D.C. Circuit vacated the FAA 
decision and remanded the determination back to the FAA.16  Taking the court’s opinion into 
account, the FAA conducted a new inquiry and released a secondary determination still finding 
that Cape Wind was not a hazard to air travel.17 
 This comment will argue the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia was arguably 
justified in finding the FAA’s first determination to be arbitrary and capricious, and that based 
upon the initial ruling, the FAA has not corrected the fatal flaw in its second determination.  In 
support of this thesis, Part II of the comment will give an overview of the approval process for 
Cape Wind and explain the required FAA determination.  Part III will explore the FAA’s initial 
no hazard determination findings regarding Cape Wind.  Part IV will summarize the arguments 
made by the parties of the Barnstable case and will address the D.C. Circuit’s holding.  Part V 
will discuss why the FAA’s second determination is still deficient under the Barnstable holding.  
Finally, Part VI will propose solutions to avoid future challenges to FAA No Hazard 
Determinations, specifically including a revision to the FAA’s own regulations.   
 
 
                                                 
13 Town of Barnstable v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 659 F.3d 28, 31 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. at 31, 36.  
17 Determination of No Hazard to Air Navigation, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., STUDY NO. 2012-WTE-322-OE, (2012) 
available at https://oeaaa.faa.gov/oeaaa/external/searchAction.jsp?action=displayOECase&oeCaseID=157246996 
(hereinafter “Study No. 2012-WTE-322-OE”).  
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II.  Permitting Cape Wind and The Need for FAA Determinations 
As the first proposed offshore wind project, Cape Wind entered uncharted statutory and 
regulatory territory from its earliest stages.  Cape Wind sought its first permit in 2001 from the 
Army Corps of Engineers (“ the Corps”), which assumed authority under the Rivers and Harbors 
Act of 1899 (“RHA”) to manage permitting for offshore wind energy projects, but without any 
explicit statutory authority.18   
Section 10 of the RHA gave the Corps the ability to permit obstructions to navigable 
waters of the United States.19  The Outer Continental Shelf Land Act (“OCSLA”) expanded the 
Corps authority to the Outer Continental Shelf.20  While there was no authority under either 
RHA or OCSLA for the Corps to grant leases for wind energy use on federal lands, in contrast, 
the Federal Land Policy and Management Act did give authority for the DOI to license onshore 
wind energy projects.21  This discrepancy between licensing onshore and offshore wind projects 
was addressed by the Energy Policy Act of 2005 which expressly granted the DOI—working in 
cooperation with other federal agencies—to grant leases on the Outer Continental Shelf for 
certain activities including wind energy production.22  Subsequently, the DOI and the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) signed a Memorandum of Understanding confirming 
                                                 
18 33 U.S.C. §§ 407-468 (2012).  Ann Yarling, Increasing Offshore Wind Projects:  A Focus on Regulatory 
Authority, (March 8, 2012) available at http://www.natlawreview.com/article/increasing-offshore-wind-projects-
focus-regulatory-authority.    
19 33 U.S.C. §§ 407-468 (2012). 
20 ADAM VANN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40175, WIND ENERGY: OFFSHORE PERMITTING 4 (2012).  The Outer 
Continental Shelf extends from the U.S. coastline and outward for 200 nautical miles.  Id. at 1.   
21 43 U.S.C. § 1701 (2012); VANN supra note 20 at 3.   
22 43 U.S.C. § 1337(p)(1) (2012); VANN supra note 20 at 4.  Part of the reason for Congressional action on the issue 
was the first lawsuit filed against Cape Wind which claimed the Corps of Engineers did not have the statutory 
authority to license the Cape Wind project.  See Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 288 
F.Supp. 2d 64 (D. Mass 2003), aff’d  398 F.3d 105 (1st Cir. 2005) (holding Corps of Engineers did have  authority 
to issue permits).  
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the exclusive jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Interior over renewable energy projects on the 
Outer Continental Shelf.23  By 2006, the Cape Wind project was under the authority of DOI. 
While DOI maintained authority over the Cape Wind project per the Energy Policy Act 
of 2005, the Act still required DOI to work in consultation with other federal agencies.24  One 
such agency was the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).25  Congress specifically tasked the 
Secretary of Transportation, who delegated this power to the FAA, to study any structures that 
may interfere with air commerce.26  Congress enumerated the specific factors considered when 
studying a structure’s impact on air travel to be:   
• The impact on arrival, departure, and en route procedures for aircraft operating 
under visual flight rules (VFR);  
 
• Impact on arrival, departure, and en route procedures for aircraft operating under 
instrument flight rules (IFR);  
 
• The impact on existing public-use airports and aeronautical facilities; the impact 
on planned public use airports and aeronautical facilities; and  
 
• The cumulative impact resulting from the proposed construction or alteration of a 
structure when combined with the impact of other existing or proposed 
structures.27 
 
Under this Congressional mandate, the FAA promulgated rules as to when a project 
triggers a review for interference with air commerce.28  These regulations state that when a 
                                                 
23 VANN supra note 20 at 5.  DOI granted its authority to site offshore energy projects to one of its agencies, the 
Mineral Management Service (MMS).  Id.  The MMS later became the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, 
Regulation, and Enforcement (BOEM) as part of a major reorganization within the Department of Interior following 
the Deepwater Horizon explosion, commonly known as the BP Oil Spill.  Press Release, DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, 
Interior Department Completes Reorganization of the Former MMS, (Sept. 30, 2011) available at 
http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/Interior-Department-Completes-Reorganization-of-the-Former-MMS.cfm. 
24 See sources cited supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
25 49 U.S.C. § 44718 (2012).   
26 Id.  While not the purpose of this comment, it is important to note that subdelegation, a subsequent delegation of 
authority to an agency within a department, is permitted under 5 U.S.C. § 302.   
27 49 U.S.C. §§ 44718(b)(1)(A)-(E) (2012). 
28 Safe, Efficient Use, and Preservation of the Navigable Airspace, 14 C.F.R. § 77 (2012). 
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structure’s height exceeds 200 feet the FAA must be notified.29  In the case of Cape Wind, each 
wind turbine tower will be 258 feet tall with the maximum height of each wind turbine blade 
being 440 feet.30  Because of the height of each turbine, Cape Wind was required to notify the 
FAA of the project and thus the FAA began a determination of whether the turbines created a 
hazard to air traffic. 
A. The FAA Determination Process   
To determine if a structure like the Cape Wind turbines will cause an impact on air travel, 
the FAA regulations determine when an obstruction exists and how a study of that object should 
be conducted.31  The FAA rules state that an object is an obstruction if it is taller than 499 feet. 32  
When the FAA conducts a study of an object that considered an obstruction, it seeks to 
determine the impact: 
• For aircraft operating under VFR;  
• On aircraft operating under IFR;  
• On existing and planned public use airports; airport traffic capacity;  
• On obstacle clearance altitudes, approach procedures, and departure procedures;  
• On impacts on radar facilities, communications, and other surveillance systems; 
• The cumulative impact of the proposed structure when combined with all other 
effects.33 
 
Based upon the findings of the study, the FAA will then make a determination as to 
whether the obstruction will be a hazard to air navigation.34  This determination will identify the 
effects on air traffic departure and arrival; air traffic procedures; minimum flight altitudes; and 
                                                 
29 Construction or alteration requiring notice, 14 C.F.R § 77.9 (2012). 
30 See sources cited supra note 8. 
31 14 C.F.R. § § 77.13 through 77.35 (2012).   
32 Obstruction standards, 14 C.F.R. § 77.17 (2012). 
33 Evaluating aeronautical effect, 14 C.F.R. § 77.29(a)(1)-(7) (2012). 
34 Determinations, 14 C.F.R. § 77.31 (2012).   
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impacts on air navigation facilities, communications, and surveillance systems.35  When there 
will be a substantial aeronautical impact, the FAA will then issue a Determination of Hazard to 
Air Navigation.36  Conversely, when the study concludes “that the proposed construction or 
alteration will exceed an obstruction standard but would not have a substantial aeronautical 
impact to air navigation” or when no obstruction standard is exceeded, the FAA will issue a 
Determination of No Hazard.37  Although a Determination of No Hazard might be issued, the 
determination may include conditional provisions, limits to minimize potential problems, 
supplemental notices, or even marking and lighting requirements.38   
Once a determination has been made, the FAA provides an internal appeals process 
called a Petition for Discretionary Review.39  The intent of this review is so individuals who 
were not given a prior opportunity can put forth substantive aeronautical comments related to the 
proposal, such as alleged impacts on air travel and radar systems.40  The Petition must include 
“new information or facts not previously considered or presented during the aeronautical study, 
including valid aeronautical reasons why the determination . . . made by the FAA should be 
reviewed.”41  
To provide further internal guidance, the FAA issued Order JO 7400.2G (“the 
Handbook”) which creates uniform procedures to be used in the administration of airspace 
management.42  The Handbook states that because the navigable airspace is a limited national 
resource, “full consideration shall be given to all airspace users, to include national defense; 
                                                 
35 Id. at (b)(1)-(2). 
36 Id. at (c). 
37 Id. at (d)-(e). 
38 Id. at (d)(1)-(4). 
39 Petitions for Discretionary Review, 14 C.F.R. §§ 77.37 through 77.41 (2012). 
40 14 C.F.R. § 77.37(a) (2012).   
41 14 C.F.R. § 77.39(b) (2012).   
42 FED. AVIATION ADMIN., PROCEDURES OF HANDLING AIRSPACE MATTERS, Order JO 7400.2G (April 10, 2008) 
available at http://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Order/7400.2G.pdf (hereafter cited as “Order JO 
7400.2G”). 
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commercial and general aviation; and space operations.  Accordingly, while a sincere effort shall 
be made to negotiate equitable solutions to conflicts over the use of the airspace for non-aviation 
purposes, preservation of the navigable airspace for aviation shall be the primary emphasis.”43   
Part Two of the Handbook supplements the statutory and regulatory framework Congress 
and the FAA have established for addressing structures interfering with airspace.44  When 
conflicts in airspace use arise, the FAA emphasizes the need to protect airspace for air navigation 
and protect air navigation facilities from either “electromagnetic or physical encroachments.”45  
Should a proposed project and airspace use conflict, the Handbook again states first priority 
should be given to altering the project.46   
Chapter Six of the Handbook details the process by which the aeronautical study required 
by the FAA regulations is to be conducted and how to evaluate whether aeronautical impacts 
exist.47  A structure has an adverse effect when it exceeds one of standards in the regulation, 
including being of a height of over 499 feet or having a physical or electromagnetic impact on air 
navigation facilities.48  Other specifically enumerated adverse effects include:  
a) Changes to an existing or planned IFR minimum flight altitude, a published or 
special instrument procedure, or an IFR departure procedure for a public-use 
airport;  
 
b) Changes to a VFR operation, to change its regular flight course or altitude;  
 
c) Restricting the clear view of runways, helipads, taxiways, or traffic patterns 
from the airport traffic control tower cab;  
 
d) Derogating airport capacity/efficiency;  
                                                 
43 Id. at 1-2-1 (emphasis added). 
44 Id. at 5-1-1 (“The guidelines, procedures, and criteria detailed in this part supplement those contained in part 77, 
Objects Affecting Navigable Airspace . . .”); 5-1-2 (“The FAA's authority to promote the safe and efficient use of 
the navigable airspace, whether concerning existing or proposed structures, is predominantly derived from Title 49 
U.S.C. Section 44718 . . .”) 
45 Id. at 6-3-1(a). 
46 Id. at 6-3-1(b). 
47 Id. at 6-1-1 through 6-3-37. 
48 Order JO 7400.2G at 6-3-3. 
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e) Affecting future VFR and/or IFR operations as indicated by plans on file; or 
  
f) Affecting the usable length of an existing or planned runway.49   
 
Although Section 6-3-3(b) states that an adverse effect exits when VFR operations are 
impacted, Section 6-3-8(c)(1) states: “A structure would have an adverse effect upon VFR air 
navigation if its height is greater than 500 feet above the surface at its site, and within 2 statute 
miles of any regularly used VFR route.”50   The Handbook also specifies that a structure could 
cause a substantial impact through a combination of adverse effects, such as impacting both 
flight courses and a significant volume of activity could be impacted.51  The Handbook states 
that the “significant volume” threshold is met if more than one flight a day would be impacted 
since “this would indicate a regular and continuing activity.”52 
III.  The FAA Initial Determination of No Hazard 
Under the framework of 49 U.S.C. 44718, 14 C.F.R 77, and the Handbook, the FAA 
conducted an aeronautical study on the Cape Wind project.53  The study:  
considered and analyzed the impact on existing and proposed arrival, departure, and 
en route procedures for aircraft operating under both visual flight rules and instrument 
flight rules; the impact on all existing and planned public-use airports, military 
airports and aeronautical facilities; and the cumulative impact resulting from the 
studied structure when combined with the impact of other existing or proposed 
structures.  The study disclosed that the described structure would have no substantial 
adverse effect on air navigation.54 
  
 As part of the Determination of No Hazard process, the FAA circulated the proposal on 
February 13, 2009 to “all known aviation interests and to non-aeronautical interests that may be 
                                                 
49 Id at 6-3-3(a)-(f).  VFR Rules allow the pilot to be able to operate the aircraft based upon his visual reference with 
the ground and surroundings while IFR Rules are in effect when the pilot cannot operate the aircraft based on visual 
references due to weather or darkness and must rely solely on instruments to navigate.  See Redhead v. U.S., 686 
F.2d 178, 180 at n.1 (3d Cir. 1982).   
50 Id. at 6-3-8(c)(1). 
51 Id. at 6-3-5. 
52 Id. 6-3-4. 
53 Study No. 2009-WTE-332-OE, at 2. 
54 Id. (emphasis added). 
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affected by the proposal.”55  It allowed one year for interested persons to review the study and 
comment, with the period for comment extended from an original deadline of March 22, 2009 to 
April 30, 2010.56  Fourteen letters of objection were filed with the FAA, and their comments 
with FAA responses made up a more than fifty percent of the Determination of No Hazard 
document issued on May 17, 2010.57  Some of the comments filed with the FAA were outside 
the scope the aeronautical study such as commenter concerns on the environmental noise impacts 
of the wind farm on the mainland and that the type of wind turbine used was improper.58  There 
were, however, two areas of concern for the commenters that did fall under the FAA purview:  
the impact on flights operating under VFR and the impact on air traffic control radar.59 
A. VFR Flight Concerns 
Public comments against Cape Wind first focused on the adverse impacts to VFR 
navigation.60  Many commenters expressed concern that a considerable number of VFR 
operations would be impacted because many pilots would move from lower altitudes of 500 to 
1000 feet to altitudes of 1000 feet or higher in order to avoid the turbines.61  Additionally, 
Nantucket Sound is subject to poor weather, which may create navigation issues for VFR pilots 
who may need to stay at certain altitudes to maintain visual observation.62  The FAA did not 
agree with the commenter’s concerns; it stated that the “proposed wind turbines [did] not exceed 
any 14 C.F.R. Part 77 obstruction standards.”63  The FAA did state however that “some aircraft 
                                                 
55 Id. at 4. 
56 Id. 
57 See sources cited supra note 53. 
58 Id. at 4-5. 
59 Study No. 2009-WTE-332-OE, at 5. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. (alteration from original).  14 C.F.R. § 77 requires a height of 499 feet or higher to be an obstruction.  See 
sources cited supra notes 26-28 and discussion. 
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operating under visual flight rules (VFR) may have to alter their altitude or route of flight.”64  
The FAA further noted that the Cape Wind project is within two statute miles of a regularly used 
VFR route.65  The FAA however determined that the project would not adversely impact VFR 
operations because Section 6-3-8(c)(1) of the Handbook states that the structure has to be above 
500 feet tall and within two statute miles of a VFR route.66  In the Determination, the FAA did 
not address Section 6-3-3(b) which states a structure has an adverse impact when it requires “a 
VFR operation, to change its regular flight course or altitude.”67  The FAA went on to note that 
the wind mill structures would be marked and/or lighted to make them “conspicuous to airmen 
should circumnavigation be necessary.”68 
B. Impact on Radar Facilities  
Most commenters took issue with the impacts on the three radar facilities which provide 
for the detection of aircraft in the Nantucket Sound area.69  The FAA agreed with the 
commenters that Cape Wind could cause “unwanted search radar targets,” known as “clutter” to 
appear on an air traffic controller’s radar screens.70  The FAA found the impact on the Otis Air 
Force Base (FMH) radar to be particularly significant because that Base uses a type of analog 
search radar system which has “limited capabilities to resolve the effects of clutter caused by 
                                                 
64 Study No. 2009-WTE-332-OE, at 7 (emphasis added). 
65 Id.  A statute mile is the standard mile of 5,280 feet.  This is compared to a nautical mile which is roughly 1.15 
statute miles.  Conversion Table For Nautical Miles and Statute Miles, NATIONAL GEOSPATIAL-INTELLIGENCE 
AGENCY (2012), http://msi.nga.mil/MSISiteContent/StaticFiles/NAV_PUBS/DBP/endtables.pdf.  
66 Id. 
67 Id.  See sources cited supra note 49 and accompanying text.   
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 5.  The three radar facilities are North Truro Cape (QEA), Nantucket (ACK), and Otis Air Force Base 
(FMH).  Id. 
70 Study No. 2009-WTE-332-OE, at 5.  The FAA reached this conclusion after conducting its own study as well as 
reviewing the studies provided by certain commenters.  Id.  As a technical matter, radar works by sending out a 
signal which then hits an object and is returned to the radar station showing an object on the radar screen.  Clutter is 
the term used to describe returns caused by surface objects (ground and sea objects caused by nature), volume 
(commonly caused by weather), and point sources (windmills, tall buildings, and other objects not caused by 
nature).  See generally RADAR TUTORIAL, http://www.radartutorial.eu/11.coherent/co04.en.html  (last visited 
January 4, 2013). 
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multiple wind turbines within a confined area.”71  The cumulative effect of the wind turbines’ 
rotation on the FMH radar system would be expected to reduce search radar detection for aircraft 
at all altitudes above the wind farm.72  To address this problem, the FAA determined that 
upgrades to the radar systems would be necessary, and Cape Wind agreed to pay $15 million into 
an escrow account for the FAA to make the modifications or install a new radar system should 
the upgrades not work.73  With this agreement in place, the FAA concluded “there [would] not 
be a significant adverse effect to radar services in Nantucket Sound.”74 
C. Petition for Discretionary Review 
Taking all the cumulative impacts of the Cape Wind project into account, the FAA did 
not consider the project to have a “substantial adverse effect” when it issued the Determination 
of No Hazard.75  As previously noted, the FAA has an internal appeals mechanism to allow those 
in disagreement with the decision to petition for discretionary review.76  Various persons 
opposed to Cape Wind filed a Petition for Discretionary Review which the FAA accepted as 
procedurally valid.77  The FAA later rejected the request for discretionary review on the 
substantive basis that the wind turbines did not exceed 500 feet in height, thus there was no 
                                                 
71 Study No. 2009-WTE-332-OE at 6.  Although the FAA determination refers to Otis Air Force Base, the facility is 
actually an Air National Guard and Coast Guard facility located on Cape Cod and is home to the 102nd Intelligence 
Wing, a non-airborne military intelligence unit.  102ND INTELLIGENCE WING http://www.102iw.ang.af.mil/ (last 
visited November 5, 2012).  
72 Study No. 2009-WTE-332-OE at 6. 
73 Id.  
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 7. 
76 See sources cited supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text. 
77 Brief for Petitioner at 23, Town of Barnstable v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 659 F.3d 28 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (No. 10-
1276).  
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adverse effect on VFR operations.78  The rejection also stated that because the FAA mitigated 
the impacts on radar system disruption, there was no cumulative impact.79 
IV. Town of Barnstable v. FAA and D.C. Circuit Holding’s Impact 
On January 19, 2011, the Town of Barnstable and the Alliance to Protect Nantucket 
Sound brought suit in the D.C. Circuit against the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).80  
The Town of Barnstable asserted it was harmed by the FAA No Hazard Determination because it 
is the operator of the Barnstable Municipal Airport (HYA) and also has an eight mile coastline 
along Nantucket Sound.81   HYA is the third busiest airport in the State of Massachusetts with 
108,657 flights occurring in 2009.82  Of those flights, 84,593 occurred under VFR as compared 
to 24,064 which occurred under IFR.83  The Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound (APNS) is a 
501(c)(3) tax exempt organization “supported by thousands of private donors including aviators, 
concerned citizens, towns and local government and civic groups, trade associations, historic 
preservation interest and associations of fishing interest and boaters that oppose industrialization 
of Nantucket Sound and use the site of [Cape Wind] to pursue their interests.”84  Their claim of 
harm was that their commercial, environmental, and recreational interest at and around the wind 
farm site would be detrimentally impacted.85   
                                                 
78 Brief for Respondent at 12, Town of Barnstable v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 659 F.3d 28 (D.C. Cir 2011) (No. 1-
1276).   
79 Id. 
80 Brief for Petitioner at 1. 
81 Id. at 22.   
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 11. 
85 Id. at 11-12.  As an aside, the opposition is a prime example of NIMBY (Not In My Backyard).  These NIMBY 
concepts are listed in a Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., op-ed where he states the views from sixteen historical lighthouses 
will be damaged and he urges visitors to come see the historic wrecks off Cape Cod, the fishing villages, and try 
some of the amazing seafood the region offers.  See source cited supra note 12 and discussion.  There is also a 
connection between APNS and a fossil fuel tycoon, William Koch, who has donated over $1.5 million to APNS and 
sits on the APNS Board of Directors.  Bill Koch: The Dirty Money Behind Cape Wind Opposition, GREENPEACE, 
(2012) http://www.greenpeace.org/usa/en/campaigns/global-warming-and-energy/polluterwatch/Bill-Koch/.  While 
APNS claims to be concerned with the environmental impacts, major environmental special interest groups support 
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A. Petitioner and Respondent Briefs 
The first argument raised in both the petitioners and FAA briefs was the issue of whether 
the parties even had standing to bring the suit.86  The Town of Barnstable argued for standing to 
challenge the FAA determination on the grounds it would be harmed as the owner/operator of 
HYA.87  For an organization like APNS to have standing, however, it must show that its 
members would have standing, the interests at stake are relevant to the purpose of the 
organization, and neither the claim nor the relief sought requires individual participation.88  
APNS used an affidavit of its President in order to establish the harm to aviation, economic 
livelihood, and recreational activities, to establish standing as an organization.89   
The FAA disputed the standing of the parties, in particular APNS.  To establish standing 
under Article III of the U.S. Constitution, a plaintiff must show the “threat of suffering injury in 
fact that is concrete and particularized; the threat must be actual and imminent, not conjectural or 
hypothetical; it must be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and it must be 
likely that a favorable judicial decision will prevent or redress the injury.”90  The FAA asserted 
that there was not only no threat of immediate harm from Cape Wind, but the FAA had no ability 
to stop the building of the project—only the Department of the Interior did—therefore the FAA 
determination cannot be traceable to their injury.91  In support of this premise, the FAA noted the 
decision to move forward with the project was made by the Department of the Interior on April 
                                                                                                                                                             
the project including the Sierra Club, Greenpeace, Clean Water Action, League of Conservation Voters, Natural 
Resources Defense Council, and the National Wildlife Federation.  Support for Cape Wind,  CAPE WIND (2012) 
http://www.capewind.org/article47.htm.  
86 See generally Petitioners’ Brief at 5-7, 26; Respondent’s Brief at 17.  Although not the focus of this comment, a 
brief discussion on standing is necessary in order to better understand the parties’ position and the court holding.   
87 Petitioner’s Brief at 26. 
88 See Friends of Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181 (2000). 
89 Id.  See also Affidavit of Audra Parker, Addendum to Petitioners’ Brief at ¶¶ 5-7. 
90 Respondent Brief at 17 (quoting Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 555U.S. 488, 493 (2009)). 
91 Id. at 18 (citing BFI Waste Sys. Of N. Am., Inc. v. FAA, 293 F.3d 527, 530 (D.C. Cir. 2002)). 
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28, 2010 but that the FAA Determination of No Hazard was not released until May 10, 2010.92  
Therefore, the FAA claimed it really had no control over the final issuance of permits for Cape 
Wind, only the Department of the Interior did.93 
Aside from standing, the true issue in dispute was the question of whether the FAA 
properly followed its own substantive standards.  APNS and the Town’s argument rested on the 
premise that the FAA violated its “statutory duties and its own regulations” because the FAA’s 
sole focus in its Determination of No Hazard was whether the wind turbines met the technical 
definition of obstruction, without taking into account the interference with air navigation.94  
Petitioners stated that Congress charged the FAA with the statutory authority  to determine 
whether a structure has an impact on air travel depending upon the factors listed in 49 U.S.C. 
44718(b).95  Under this authority, the FAA promulgated the regulations found in 14 C.F.R. 77 
and issued the Handbook to provide internal guidance on how to determine when a structure is 
an obstruction, either by size or by creating a substantially adverse aeronautical effect.96  The 
Town and APNS asserted that the FAA’s issuance of a Determination of No Hazard was 
arbitrary and capricious because the decision did not comport with what the Handbook 
prescribed.97  In other words, the FAA failed to follow its own guidance.   
The Handbook instructs that the first priority of the FAA is the protection of airspace and 
that altering the proposal should be the first priority in the case of conflicts.98  The Handbook 
goes on to state that an adverse effect exists when there is an obstruction standard violation under 
                                                 
92 Id. at 21. 
93 Id. 
94 Petitioners’ Brief at 16. 
95 See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
96 Petitioners’ Brief at 18-19.  See supra Section II-A.    
97 Id. at 19-20. 
98 Order 7400.2G at 1-2-1.  Petitioners’ Brief at 18.   
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14 C.F.R. 77 and/or an impact on air navigation facilities.99  This existed here because there was 
an impact on radar facilities.100  In addition, because the FAA found that there would have to be 
changes to certain aircraft operating under VFR, petitioners assert this meant there was an 
adverse impact under 6-3-3(b).101  Moreover, since the FAA found that some VFR aircraft would 
be impacted, this could be a combination of impacts under 6-3-5.102 Lastly, petitioners pointed to 
a provision in the Handbook which states that if there is evidence of a structure being a hazard, 
the FAA has no discretion to find otherwise.103 
The FAA disputed the petitioners’ view and claimed it met their statutory and regulatory 
obligations.  First, the FAA stated that the statutory and regulatory authority tells the FAA when 
to conduct an aeronautical study and what should be taken into account as a part of that study.104  
The FAA claimed it did exactly that and where the statute fell silent, it filled in the gaps with the 
regulations and Handbook. 105  Therefore, the FAA claimed it should be owed Chevron 
deference because Congress told them to conduct the study, leaving how to use and apply the 
findings of the study up to the FAA.106   
Second, the FAA claimed it followed prior court precedent and its decision in Cape Wind 
was generally consistent with prior determinations it had made.  The FAA noted that agency 
interpretations of its own regulations are controlling unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with 
the regulation.107  The D.C. Circuit held on a prior occasion that the FAA should also issue a 
                                                 
99 Order 7400.2G at 6-3-3. 
100 See supra Section III-B. 
101 See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text. 
102 Petitioners’ Brief at 40.  See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
103 Order 7400.2G at 7-1-3(c) (emphasis added). 
104 Respondent Brief at 5. 
105 Id. at 14-15. 
106 Id. at 29-30.  See also Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-844 (1984).  
Chevron deference is the concept that if a statute administered by an agency is ambiguous with respect to the 
specific issue, the courts will defer to the agency's reasonable interpretation of the statute.   
107 Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997). 
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finding of a hazard when the structure exceeded the 14 C.F.R. 77 standards or had an effect on 
local air navigation facilities.108  Because the FAA claimed it also took into account and 
answered all the comments and issued raised during the public comment period, the FAA 
asserted it met its obligations to adequately explain its results and respond to relevant and 
significant public comments.109 
B. Overview of the Court Opinion  
On October 28, 2011, the D.C. Circuit decided Barnstable, holding that the petitioners 
had standing and that the FAA determination was vacated and remanded.  Even though the court 
agreed that the FAA determination has no “enforceable legal effect” and cannot prevent the 
building of Cape Wind, it found that the Department of Interior (DOI) gave the FAA a 
significant role in the decision making process when it mandated that construction could not 
begin until the receipt of the FAA hazard determination and compliance with any mitigation 
measures.110  This reliance by the DOI on the FAA created a redressability issue because it 
would be “improbable” that the FAA’s determination would be “blithely disregarded.”111 
On the substantive matter of the No Hazard Determination, the court held the 
determination was indeed arbitrary and capricious because the FAA departed from the 
Handbook.112  The court based this reasoning off the varying definitions of “substantial adverse 
effect” which existed throughout the Handbook.  For example, substantial adverse impact is 
defined in 6-3-3 of the Handbook as existing when there is an obstruction standard violation 
                                                 
108 D&F Alfonso Realty Trust v. Garvey, 216 F.3d 1191, 1195 (D.C. Cir. 2000).   
109 Public Citizen, Inc. v. FAA, 988 F.2d 186, 197 (D.C. Cir. 1993)(citing Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC 567 F.2d 
9, 35 & FN 58 (D.C. Cir. 1977)).   
110 Town of Barnstable v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 659 F.3d 28, 31-32 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 
111 Id. at 34.  In support of this, the court also cited Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 170 (1997), which granted 
standing despite the fact the decision maker was free to disregard the opinion in question. 
112 Id. at 34. 
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under 14 C.F.R. 77 or when there is an effect on the operations of the air traffic system.113  In 
section 6-3-4 of the Handbook, substantial impact exists when there is an adverse impact on a 
significant number of flight operations, and Section 6-3-5 states there could be a substantial 
adverse effect if there is a cumulative impact under Sections 6-3-3 and 6-3-4.114  Yet in the view 
of the FAA, all these prior definitions are seemingly irrelevant because of Section 6-3-8(c)(1), 
which states that there can be a substantial adverse impact on VFR routes when an object is over 
500 feet tall and is within two miles of a VFR route.115 Because the FAA put its sole reliance on 
the definition of substantial adverse impact under Section 6-3-8(c)(1) without addressing the 
other issues raised in Sections 6-3-3, 6-3-4, and 6-3-5, the court held the FAA was “improperly 
relying . . . on 6-3-8(c)(1)” and it “failed to supply any apparent analysis of the record evidence 
concerning the wind farm’s potentially adverse effects on VFR operations.”116 
C. The Barnstable Holding’s View on Agency Deference  
The D.C. Circuit’s ruling in Barnstable greatest impact was in the area of the amount of 
deference an agency can expect with regard to interpreting its own rules.117  Agency regulations 
are promulgated under the authority of a statutory mandate and are generally reviewable for the 
procedural requirements of notice and comment and their substantive requirements.118  However, 
agency interpretations of their own rules, such as the FAA’s interpretation of substantial adverse 
effect, are generally given greater deference unless the interpretation is plainly erroneous or 
                                                 
113 Id. at 35.   
114 Id. at 34. 
115 Id. at 35. 
116 Town of Barnstable v. FAA at 35.   
117 Whether the court correctly found the parties to have standing is a different matter and this comment does not 
focus on that issue. At least one observer stated the court decided the standing question correctly as either expanding 
the Bennett decision to just applying Bennett in its logical application.  See, e.g,. Barbara E. Lichman , D.C. Circuit 
Court of Appeals Takes FAA to the Woodshed in Cape Cod Wind Farm Case, AVIATION & AIRPORT DEVELOPMENT 
LAW NEWS (November 2, 2011), http://www.aviationairportdevelopmentlaw.com/2011/11/articles/faa-1/litigation-
1/dc-circuit-court-of-appeals-takes-faa-to-the-woodshed-in-cape-cod-wind-farm-case/. 
118 CHARLES H. KOCH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW & PRACTICE, § 10.23 (2012).  Regulations, like 14 C.F.R. § 77, are 
promulgated under the Administrative Procedures Act. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012). 
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inconsistent with the regulation.119  In the Administrative Procedures Act, which sets forth the 
standard of judicial review governing federal agency decisions in the absence of an explicit 
provisions of the enabling act, decisions can be set aside as “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.”120  Most court decisions note that this 
deference is not controlling, rather it can be overcome by the judiciary when it strongly feels 
there is a lack of a rational connection between the facts and the policies enacted.121 
Because Barnstable turns on the FAA’s interpretation of its Handbook and its regulations 
in promulgating the hazard determinations, the court’s level of review should be deferential 
unless the FAA decision was completely misguided.  Auer v. Robbins is the leading case in this 
area.122  In Auer, police sergeants and a lieutenant in the St. Louis Police Department sued under 
the Fair Labor Standards Act claiming they were owed overtime pay.123  The City of St. Louis 
argued the officers were exempt from overtime pay as executive level personnel.124  The 
Department of Labor had previously issued regulations stating that the overtime exemption 
applied to employees paid a specified minimum amount on a salary basis, which required that the 
compensation “not [be] subject to reduction because of variations in the quality or quantity of the 
work performed.”125  Even though the St. Louis Police Manual stated that the officers’ pay could 
be reduced for disciplinary actions, the Department of Labor interpreted its own regulation 
                                                 
119 Id. at § 10.26.  The concept of “plainly erroneous and inconsistent” stems from Bowles v. Seminole Rock, 325 
US 410, 413-414 (1945) whether the court stated, “But the ultimate criterion is the interpretation, which becomes of 
controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”  Although still good law, the 
plainly erroneous language of Seminole Rock has been replaced by the statutory language of the APA, which was 
enacted after Seminole Rock.   
120 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012).   
121 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)(citing Burlington 
Truck Lines, Inc. v. U.S., 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)).   
122 519 U.S. 452 (1997). 
123 Auer at 452. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. (alterations to original). 
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excluding reductions in salary for reasons such as disciplinary measures.126  In a unanimous 
decision written by Justice Scalia, the Court upheld the Department of Labor’s interpretation of 
this “salary basis test” for overtime because the standard was created by the Department and 
therefore its interpretation should be left to the agency unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent 
with the regulations.127   
 This trend towards deference can be found in other cases.  In a different Supreme Court 
decision, the Court held that when the analysis of the documents requires a high degree of 
technical expertise, courts should defer to the informed discretion of the responsible agency.128 
Notwithstanding, courts do not blindly defer to an agency without carefully reviewing the record 
to ensure the agency has made a reasoned decision based on the information.129  The D.C. 
Circuit has also acknowledged that substantial deference is owed to agencies in interpreting their 
own regualtions.  In Breneman v. FAA130, a structure being built on a hill would extend 62 feet 
into the airport’s approach surface.131  The FAA determined the structure to be a hazard based 
upon an earlier version of the Handbook and the court upheld that determination because the 
evidence, in the court’s view, was sufficient to support the decision.132 
 Based upon these cases, it seems plausible that the issuance of the Cape Wind No Hazard 
Determination and the explanations contained within should be sufficient to survive judicial 
                                                 
126 Id. 
127 Auer at 461.   
128 Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360, 377 (1989).  This case addressed  the issuance of 
permits by the Army Corps of Engineers and whether those permits could be issued based upon the available 
information or whether new information needed to be considered by the Corps.  The Court held in favor of the 
Corps, finding that the Corps decision not to issue a supplemental report based on the additional information was not 
arbitrary and capricious.  Id at 384-385.     
129 Id. 
130 30 Fed. Appx. 7 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
131 An approach surface is this imaginary slope line that extends upwards into the airspace from the runway in order 
to prevent objects from entering the path of aircraft.  Airport Approach Surface, WILLIAMS AVIATION 
CONSULTANTS, http://www.wacaz.com/services/obstruction-evaluation/airport-approach-surface/ (last visited Jan. 
15, 2012). 
132 Id. at 8.  The court also seemed to dislike the plaintiff who was purposely building up the hill in order to impede 
air traffic, thus violating the Court’s “chutzpah doctrine.”  Id.  
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review.  Just like in Auer,133 the FAA was using an interpretation of its Handbook in order to 
make a decision about whether Cape Wind was a hazard to air traffic.  The FAA was also 
making a determination about air traffic in the Cape Wind area that required some type of 
technical expertise, thereby allowing the court to defer to the informed discretion of the agency 
as was the case in Marsh134 and Breneman135.  Unfortunately for the FAA, the D.C. Circuit 
required more of a connection between the determination and every aspect of the Handbook that 
addresses the definition of a substantially adverse situation.  The court’s reliance on D&F Afonso 
Realty illustrates this point.136   
 In D&F, a home was built near a small privately owned airport, thus requiring the FAA 
to be notified because of the proximity between the residence and the airport.137  The FAA 
determined the home intruded the “transitional surface”138 airspace around the airport by 16.1 
feet.139  The FAA conducted an aeronautical study under 14 C.F.R. 77 and determined the house 
would cause a substantial adverse effect on the airport and inbound flights operating under 
VFR.140  The Massachusetts Aeronautics Commission followed the FAA’s determination and the 
town refused to issue an Occupant Certificate for the house.141  The hazard determination was 
challenged in the D.C. Circuit, and the court held that the decision to find the house a hazard was 
arbitrary, capricious, and not in accord with the law.142  The court reached this conclusion by 
finding that the FAA did not properly follow its guidelines entitled “Procedures for Handling 
                                                 
133 See supra notes 122 through 127and accompanying text. 
134 See supra notes 128 through 129 and discussion. 
135 See supra notes 130 through 132 and accompanying text. 
136 Town of Barnstable at 36. 
137 D&F Afonso Realty Trust v. Garvey, 216 F.3d 1191, 1192 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
138 This transitional surface extends up and out from the runway centerline and from the sides of the primary surface 
and the approach surface.  Id.     
139 Id. at 1193. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. at 1195. 
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Airspace Matters.”143  Specifically, while the court did find the house violated the transitional 
surface around the airport, there was no link between the hazard determination and the hazard 
standard.144  Moreover, there were other structures like trees which also impeded the transitional 
surface, yet the FAA failed to take that into account.145  The court succinctly stated, “[e]ven our 
highly deferential standard of review requires more than the FAA offers.  Thus, the FAA’s 
abandonment of its own established procedures and its lack of reasoned analysis on the record 
constitute arbitrary and capricious agency action in violation of the law.”146 
V. The FAA Determination on Remand Is Still Deficient Under Barnstable 
In response to the D.C. Circuit decision in Barnstable, the FAA conducted a new hazard 
determination for the Cape Wind project including a new study and new public comment 
period.147 On August 15, 2012, the FAA issued a second Determination of No Hazard for the 
Cape Wind project.148  This latest determination attempts to address the holding the D.C. Circuit 
expressed in Barnstable by rewriting how it reached used its own guidelines to determine if a 
structure will have a substantial adverse impact.149  The FAA stated in this new Determination 
that its first step was to determine if a violation of 14 C.F.R. 77 exists.150  If so, then it must 
proceed to the second step of evaluating whether there was an adverse effect.151  If an adverse 
effect is found, then the structure will be found to be a hazard.152  In this new Determination, the 
FAA explicitly clarified that there is no violation of 14 C.F.R. 77 and therefore no hazard to air 
                                                 
143 D&F Afonso Realty Trust at 1195.  The “Procedures for Handling Airspace Matters” is an older version of the 
Handbook.  
144 Id at 1196.   
145 Id. 
146 Id. at 1196-1197.   
147 Study No. 2012-WTE-322-OE.  
148 Id. 
149 Id. at 3. 
150 Id. 
151 Id. 
152 Id. 
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navigation.153 The FAA made this decision because the project is below the 499 foot threshold, 
and the FAA installed upgraded radar equipment to address the “clutter” issue found in the first 
determination.154  Therefore, the FAA claimed there is no need to analyze the project using the 
Handbook Section 6-3-3, which is one of the sections addressing substantial adverse effects.155  
The FAA also reasserted there is no reason to analyze the issue under 6-3-8(c)(1) because this 
only applies if both the criteria of 500 feet in height and two miles within a VFR lane exist.156  
While Cape Wind is within two miles of a VFR lane, the wind farm does not exceed the height 
requirement of 500 feet.157 
Although a slightly improved explanation, the August 2012 Determination of No Hazard 
has already been challenged by the Town of Barnstable and APNS in the D.C. Circuit and will 
likely be vacated and remanded again by that court.158  The FAA is attempting to lead the court 
away from the conflicting definitions of substantial adverse impact that exist in the Handbook, 
but this maneuver is unlikely to pass muster.159  The statutory authority under which the FAA 
operates requires the study of any structure that could impact the enumerated factors listed in the 
statute.160  Moreover, the obstruction standards under 14 C.F.R. 77, which the FAA states are not 
violated, are only one piece of the puzzle, as there are other regulatory provisions which may be 
violated.161  These provisions have become implicated because despite the FAA claiming it need 
not perform a study, the FAA did in fact gather data on VFR traffic to “respond to the court’s 
                                                 
153 Study No. 2012-WTE-322-OE at 3.   
154 Id.  See also supra note 69 and accompanying text.    
155 Id. 
156 Id. at 6.   
157 Id. 
158 Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound v. FAA, Petition for Review, August 22, 2012 (No. 12-1363). 
159 See supra note 152 and accompanying text. 
160 See sources cited supra note 27 and accompany text. 
161 See 14 C.F.R. § 91.119 which requires a 500 foot distance between objects and aircraft. 
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concern raised in [Barnstable].”162  As part of this data collection contained in the newest No 
Hazard Determination, the FAA stated that “some aircraft under VFR may have to alter their 
altitude or route of flight.”163  In fact, the study concluded that that for a nine month period 
between January and September 2011, there were 427 aircraft operating below 949 feet, which 
would be in violation of 14 C.F.R. 91.119 should the wind farm be in place.164  The study also 
stated that fifty two percent of VFR aircraft operations occurred over the southeast corner of the 
wind farm area.165 
As the D.C. Circuit noted in Barnstable, the provisions in the Handbook identify multiple 
ways a structure can cause an adverse effect, especially for VFR traffic.166  The idea that a 
structure has to be above a certain height and within a certain distance in order to cause an 
adverse effect, as 14 C.F.R. 77 or Section 6-3-8(c)(1) prescribes, “simply identifies one 
circumstance . . . potentially one among many.”167  Despite the FAA’s insistence that Section 6-
3-3 is not implicated and that it is again solely relying on 6-3-8(c)(1), it seems unlikely the D.C. 
Circuit will backtrack and look favorably on this No Hazard Determination.  The FAA did not 
address Handbook Section 6-3-3, and it also failed to discuss 6-3-4 which the Court observed can 
also cause an adverse impact when more than one aeronautical operation a day would be 
affected.168     
The FAA also did not discuss two other Sections of the Handbook which the Court 
expressly mentioned in its opinion.  These are Handbook Section 6-3-5169 and Section 6-3-8(b), 
                                                 
162 Study 2012-WTE-322-OE at 4. 
163 Id. at 6. 
164 Id. at 7.   
165 Id. 
166 Town of Barnstable, 659 F.3d at 35.   
167 Id. 
168 Id. at 34. 
169 See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
 
25 
 
which states that “any structure that would interfere with a significant volume of low altitude 
flights by actually excluding or restricting VFR operations in a specific area would have a 
substantial adverse effect and may be considered a hazard to air navigation.”170 Considering the 
data the FAA provided that showed at least one flight per day could be impacted, it seems 
unlikely the court will agree that the second No Hazard Determination was proper.171 
VI. The Need For a Revised FAA Handbook 
In Barnstable, D&F, and Breneman, the core issue the courts ultimately addressed was 
whether the FAA followed its own guidelines contained in the Handbook for when structural 
interference exists.  The first of these cases, D&F, was decided in 2000, so the conflict the 
Handbook causes is not new by any means.  But the application of the Handbook to wind farm 
development is a novel issue, especially as the growth of the wind energy sector continues in the 
United States.  Wind farms become more cost effective when they are located closer to 
population centers172, therefore conflicts related to when a structure poses a hazard will become 
more prevalent.173  
Some recent scholarship has suggested that the United States should enact comprehensive 
legislative reforms for siting wind farms.174  The problem with these worthy solutions is one of 
pragmatism; Congress lacks the necessary political will and cohesion in order to act on such 
                                                 
170 Town of Barnstable at 36. 
171 See supra notes 163-164and accompanying text. 
172 Offshore Wind Energy Could Power Entire East Coast, STANFORD UNIVERSITY, (Sept. 14, 2012) 
http://news.stanford.edu/news/2012/september/offshore-wind-energy-091412.html.  
173 Wind Farms Run Into Turbulence With the FAA, AVIATION AND AIRPORT DEVELOPMENT LAW NEWS, (Jan. 25, 
2010)  http://www.aviationairportdevelopmentlaw.com/2010/01/articles/faa-1/regulatory/wind-farms-run-into-
turbulence-with-the-faa/.  
174 See, e.g., Gregory J. Rigano, The Solution to the United States’ Energy Troubles is Blowing in the Wind, 39. 39 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 201 (2011)(discussing the environmental benefits of wind energy and the need for Congress to 
pass an “Offshore Energy Wind Act” which the author proposes a draft of); Kenneth Kimmell & Dawn Stolfi 
Stalenhoef, The Cape Wind Offshore Wind Energy Project: A Case Study of the Difficult Transition to Renewable 
Energy, 5 GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 197 (2011)(discussing the early permitting process for Cape Wind and 
recommending Congress enact a “one stop shop” for wind farm permitting); Erica Schroeder, Turning Offshore 
Wind On, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1631 (2010)(arguing for Congressionally enacted changes to the Coastal Zone 
Management Act).     
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matters.  While the topic of wind farms seems mundane to the average observer, the politics 
surrounding alternative energies is complicated due to government support for companies like 
Solyndra who have gone bankrupt even after generous tax breaks and government stimulus 
dollars.175 With Congress’ inability to solve even the most immediate problems facing the 
country, coupled with other pressing issues on the national agenda, legislation on alternative 
energy is unlikely to occur. 
Another commentator has also recommended that agencies involved in the permitting and 
siting of wind farms become more aware of the opposition to these projects and conduct more 
thorough analyses and thus better explanations.176  However, this fails to recognize the fact that 
FAA, as with other federal agencies, is facing a greater demand on its services without the 
corresponding increase in funding; thus, the FAA is doing more with much less.177  While the 
FAA’s role in siting wind farms is certainly important, it is understandable that the FAA may not 
be put the level of effort some want into this area considering the FAA’s other obligations such 
as air traffic control, airplane and airline regulation, and air travel technology development.178    
Because Congress is unlikely to act and the FAA has few resources to tackle this issue, 
the FAA must find a cheap and independent method of remedying this problem for Cape Wind 
and future wind farm projects.  The only viable solution is for the FAA to modify its own 
                                                 
175 Matthew Mosk and Ronnie Green, Did Obama Adminstration Cut Corners For a Green Energy Company, ABC 
NEWS (May 24, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/obama-administration-solyndra/story?id=13640783.  See also 
infra note 179 and accompanying text. 
176 Heidi Willers, Grounding the Cape Wind project:  How the FAA played into the hands of wind farm opponents 
and what we can learn from it, 77 J. AIR. L. & COM. 605, 633-635 (2012). 
177 Until February 2012, the FAA operated under a series of 23 separate continuing funding resolutions from 2007 to 
2012 and actually had a partial shutdown in early 2012.  Keith Laing, Obama signs $63B FAA funding bill into law, 
THE HILL (Feb. 14, 2012), http://thehill.com/blogs/transportation-report/aviation/210649-obama-signs-63b-faa-
funding-bill-into-law.  The bill signed by President Obama keeps funding levels at Fiscal Year 2011 levels and does 
not provide an increase many in Congress hoped for.  Pete Kasperowicz, House approves first long term FAA 
funding bill in eight years, THE HILL (Feb. 3, 2012), http://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/house/208535-house-
approves-first-long-term-faa-funding-bill-in-eight-years.  
178 What We Do, FED. AVIATION ADMIN. (March 10, 2005) http://www.faa.gov/about/mission/activities/. 
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Handbook to make it friendlier for the agency to use and the court to interpret.  By taking this 
small step, it will reduce its costs and burdens in the long term for the FAA.179  Specifically, the 
FAA should modify Chapter 6 of the Handbook in order to make the procedures for airspace 
management more streamlined.  A proposal would be to turn Sections 6-3-3, 6-3-4, and 6-3-5 
into one new Section.180  This new section could read: 
 6-3-3 Substantial Adverse Impact  
For a structure to have a substantial adverse impact, it must first exceed an 
obstruction standard under 14 C.F.R. 77.17.  If this exists, then there must also be 
at least one of the following conditions met for a substantial adverse impact to be 
found: 
a. Requires a change to an existing or planned IFR minimum flight 
altitude, a published or special instrument procedure, or an IFR 
departure procedure for a public-use airport. 
 
b. Requires a VFR operation to change its regular flight course or 
altitude. This does not apply to VFR military training route (VR) 
operations conducted under part 137, or operations conducted under a 
waiver or exemption to the CFR. 
 
c. Restricts the clear view of runways, helipads, taxiways, or traffic 
patterns from the airport traffic control tower cab. 
 
d. Derogates airport capacity/efficiency by impacting at least one 
aeronautical operation per day. 
 
e.   Affects future VFR and/or IFR operations as indicated by plans on file. 
 
f.   Affects the usable length of an existing or planned runway.   
 
g. Causes interference with the operation of air navigation or    
communication equipment. 
 
 This revised Section 6-3-3 makes clear when the provisions of 6-3-3 are supposed to 
apply.  It removes the confusing “and/or” language contained in the current version and it also 
                                                 
179 A reader of this comment may be thinking to themselves, “Wouldn’t it be costly and time consuming for the 
FAA to do this as well?”  My response is that the cost and time associated with issuing a clarification to its 
Handbook is far less than the years spent in court litigating matters of interpretation.  
180 The current language of Section 6-3-3, 6-3-4, and 6-3-5 is contained supra notes 48 through 52 for comparison 
by the reader. 
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clarifies the current provisions of 6-3-4 and 6-3-5 by including them in 6-3-3 so as to keep all the 
substantial adverse effect language under one section.  Such a change will make court 
interpretation easier and improve the efficiency of FAA determinations.181      
 If the FAA Handbook contained the above language, it is possible the determination on 
Cape Wind would not have been overturned.  Cape Wind never would have triggered this 
“substantial adverse effect” language based upon the fact it did not exceed the standards in 14 
C.F.R. 77.17.182  The only reason the “substantial adverse impact” argument can be used by the 
opponents of Cape Wind is because the current version of the Handbook does not define 
substantial adverse impact as needing the pre-requisite violation of 14 C.F.R. 77.17.  The 
proposed language removes their main argument, addresses the problems specified by the D.C. 
Circuit in Barnstable183, and curtails the likely argument of future anti-wind farm advocates. 
VII. Conclusion 
The Cape Wind project is an example of the problems that face wind energy development 
project in the United States.184  Not only are their political implications from nearby residents 
and other special interest groups,185 but a host of regulatory challenges which wind farm 
                                                 
181 Although Section 6-3-8(c)(1) is discussed in detail in this note, there is no reason to change the language 
contained therein because it already requires a structure to be taller than 500 feet and be within 2 miles of a VFR 
route, thus Cape Wind does not trigger this Section.  Order 7400.2G at 6-3-8(c)(1).   
182 For a discussion on 14 C.F.R. § 77.17 see supra note 32. 
183 See supra notes 110 through 116 and discussion contained therein. 
184 Not all wind mills face opposition.  For example, Atlantic City, NJ hosts five, 380 foot, wind mills directly on the 
bay and has found that the wind mills have not only increased tourism, but home values with views of the wind mills 
has increased faster than those without the view.  Molly Golubcow, Tourism that Blows, ATLANTIC CITY WEEKLY 
(Jan. 26, 2006), http://www.atlanticcityweekly.com/arts-and-entertainment/features/tourism_that_blows-
50733287.html.   
185 In addition to concerns noted supra at notes 12, 85 and 175 Congress has also gotten involved.  On August 8, 
2012, Congressman Darrell Issa (R-CA), Chairman of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, wrote 
a letter to President Obama suggesting the President’s support for wind energy programs created political pressures 
on the FAA to approve the project.  Letter from Congressman Darrell Issa to President Barak Obama (August 8, 
2012) at 4 available at http://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/Chairman-Issa-to-President-Obama-
8-8-12.pdf.  Further evidence of the polarized nature of Cape Wind can be found in a letter from APNS President 
Audra Parker to the FAA suggests the FAA succumbed “to political pressure with suboptimal decisions leading to 
serious public safety risks.”  Letter from Audra Parker to FAA Acting Administrator Michael Huerta (May 22, 
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proponents may not even consider including the obtainment of FAA approvals due to the height 
and other aeronautical issues associated with wind turbines.  
As more wind farms projects are proposed, challenges to their construction will occur 
more frequently.  The FAA will continually be placed in the position of determining whether 
these projects have an adverse effect on air traffic.  While the benefits and pitfalls of wind energy 
may be at the core of many challenges, it is the role of the judiciary not to consider those issues, 
but whether the FAA properly issued its determinations.186  In the case of Cape Wind, the D.C. 
Circuit was justified in its holding that the FAA did not properly follow its own Handbook in 
determining whether the wind turbines would cause an adverse impact to air traffic.  Because the 
FAA failed to appropriately address those issues in its most recent Determination of No Hazard, 
the latest challenge to Cape Wind will likely be successful, thus delaying the project even 
further.  The FAA should learn from this experience and make the changes this comment 
suggests to its Handbook.  Doing so would be prudent, so as to not impede worthy wind farm 
projects, but also to reduce agency costs as resources become scarcer.  Wind farms development 
is here and the FAA cannot rely on Congress or the judiciary to rescue it from its regulatory 
obligations; it must fix its own problems from the inside. 
 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                             
2012) at 12 available at 
http://www.saveoursound.org/userfiles/files/APNS%2BLetter%2Bto%2BFAA%2Bre%2BFOIA%2B5%2B22%2B1
2%5B1%5D.pdf.  
186 The D.C. Circuit did note that “while of course the wind farm may be one of those projects which such 
overwhelming policy benefits (and political support) as to trump all other considerations, even as they relate to 
safety, the record expresses no such proposition.”  Town of Barnstable, 659 F.2d at 33. 
